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Has the Cold War returned to East
Asia?
James T.H. Tang
School of Social Sciences, Singapore Management University,
Singapore
The rise of a non-democratic China as the world ‘s second largest economy, still
officially subscribing to Communism or ‘Socialism with Chinese characteristics’
as its ideology1, has raised the spectre of the return of the Cold War to Asia with
the United States and China on opposing sides, with China backed by Russia, its
former Cold War ally. But to what extent are there historical parallels between
the Cold War and the current East Asian international relations system?
According to this view, East Asian international relations at the beginning of the 21st
century is characterised by intense rivalry between the United States and China for
supremacy in the Asia-Pacific region through political and economic contests, by
military confrontation, and also indirectly between the People’s Republic and
America’s allies in the region such as Japan and the Philippines.2
While China is gaining greater influence in the region with its growing economic
power and political clout, the US under Obama is also strengthening its diplomatic,
q 2014 Taylor & Francis
Professor James T.H. Tang is Dean and Professor of Political Science, School of Social Sciences, Singapore
Management University. He is a specialist in international relations, with special reference to China/Hong Kong
and the Asia-Pacific region. Email: jamestang@smu.edu.sg
1 In Xi Jinping’s first speech as the new Chinese leader, after assuming his position as Party Secretary at
the 18th Party Congress in November 2012, he declared that, “we will ensure that our Party will remain at
the core of leadership in advancing the cause of socialism with Chinese characteristics”. Xinhua report on
19 November 2012. http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2012cpc/2012-11/19/content_15939817.htm.
By adopting the term “Socialism with Chinese Characteristics” – zhongguo tese de shehui zhuyi, the
Chinese Communist Party has argued that it has not abandoned socialism by introducing foreign capital
and the opening up the Chinese economy to market forces. See for example a report on Deng Xiaoping’s
remarks to visiting Japanese delegation in 1984, “Build Socialism with Chinese Characteristics” People’s
Daily, 30 June 1984. http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/dengxp/vol3/text/c1220.html.
2 See for example: Carlye A. Thayer, “AMaritime Test of Strength”, The Security Times, January 31, 2014;
Geoff Dyer, “US vs China: is this the new cold war?” FT Magazine, 20 February 2014; Zachary Keck, “US-
China Rivalry More Dangerous Than Cold War”, The Diplomat, 28 January 2014.
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economic andmilitary presence in the Asia-Pacific region. For some observers, the two
major powers are now locked in a fierce contest for domination in the region and a
new Cold War in East Asia is unfolding.
In his book The Contest of the Century, Geoff Dyer argued that the Sino-American
rivalry will become the defining geopolitical contest of the 21st century. In his words,
‘China and the United States are starting to contest the high ground of international
politics, from control of the oceans in Asia to the currency that is used in international
business’ and ‘almost every important global issue will find itself colored by this rivalry’.
He maintained that the US and China are doomed to repeat the intense rivalry and
competition of the Cold War.3 Following the Realist logic, as presented by scholars like
John Mearsheimer, a war between China and the US is likely if the Chinese economy
continues to grow.4 Others like John Ikenberry, a liberal thinker, argue that war is
avoidable if China could embrace the core elements of the liberal international order. 5
To what extent has the Cold War returned to East Asia in the form of ideological
competition, and a contest between China and the US over their respective economic
strength, political influence and military might? Are there any historical parallels
between the Cold War and the current East Asian international relation system?
East Asian International Relations from the Cold War to the Post-Cold War
While the Cold War was a global competition between the West and the Soviet Union,
the initial contest in East Asiawas primarily betweenChina, then part of the Soviet bloc,
and the Western powers under American leadership. China’s military involvement in
the Korean peninsula in the early 1950s marked the beginning of two decades of bitter
confrontation between the Chinese communist regime and the United States. The two
countries were also on opposing sides in Indochina during the 1960s when the US tried
to prevent losing Southeast Asian countries to the Communist camp through the
domino effect. The US also supported the Kuomintang government that retreated to
Taiwan after being defeated by Communist forces on mainland China.
The solidarity of the Communist world, however, was tested in East Asia at the very
beginning of the Cold War when the Chinese leader Mao Zedong expressed interest in
the establishment of an Asian Cominform in 1950. Development in Asia, as suggested
in more recent Cold War history scholarship, was more complicated than the
conventional view of a global East-West competition. As the work of Zhihua Shen and
Yafeng Xia demonstrated, after coming into power in 1949, the Chinese Communist
Party played an active role in supporting other communist movements in Asia such
as the Workers’ Party of Korea, and the Communist Parties in Burma and Malaya.
3 Geoff Dyer, The Contest of the Century: The New Era of Competition with China - And How America
Can Win, (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2014).
4 John Mearsheimer, “The Rise of China Will Not Be Peaceful at All”, The Australian, 18 November 2005.
5 G. John Ikenberry “America’s Challenge: The Rise of China and the Future of Liberal International
Order”, New America Foundation, July 2011.
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While China was still part of the Soviet camp, Mao had assumed a leadership role in
the Communist camp in Asia by the mid-1950s.6
During the Cold War era Washington’s approach to regional security was based on
an alliance system with bilateral security treaties between the US and key allies in the
Asia-Pacific region including South Korea, Japan, Taiwan, Thailand, and the
Philippines, and under a different framework Australia and New Zealand (through
ANZUS) creating an arc of containment in the region against China in the form of the
‘spoke and hub’ - an expression made famous by President Eisenhower’s Secretary of
State John Foster Dulles. This US-dominated East Asian security system forms the
security architecture in the region. Washington’s objective was to contain China and
counter the Soviet threat to American interests in the Asia-Pacific. The system also
allowed access to the American market and other economic benefits to US allies in the
region.7 The political divisions in the region created by the Cold War – a Korea
divided into the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (North) and the Republic of
Korea (South) as well as the People’s Republic of China (mainland China) and the
Republic of China (Taiwan) – are still a defining characteristic of East Asia’s strategic
landscape.
While the Cold War did not end until 1991, the strategic balance in East Asia
fundamentally shifted in favour of the US as early as 1970s following the Sino-Soviet
split in the late 1960s and the subsequent US-China rapprochement. The Sino-Soviet
split during the 1960s shifted the Cold War scene in East Asia from a US-Soviet global
struggle with China as part of the Eastern bloc to a US-China contest when the
Chinese communists turned against the Soviet Union. This transformed the structure
of the Cold War in Asia. From the mid-1960s onward, Beijing attempted to establish
itself as a ‘third pole’ by competing with the Soviet Union as the leader of the Third
World and against the US at the same time. By the early 1970s, China was still
promoting the three worlds theory - with the superpowers (i.e. the US and the USSR)
forming the First World, other developed countries such as Western European
countries, Canada, and Australia belonging to the Second World, and developing
countries in Asia, Africa, and Latin America constituting the Third World, with China
as their champion.8
Following Nixon’s 1972 China visit, however, the US and China formed an implicit
alliance against the Soviet Union which lasted until the end of the 1980s. While the so
called ‘Great Power Triangle’ between the US, the Soviet Union and the People’s
Republic certainly complicated the international relations landscape in East Asia,
6 Zhihua Shen and Yafeng Xia, “Leadership transfer in the Asian revolution: Mao Zedong and the Asian
Cominform”, Cold War History, (2014) 14:2, pp.195–213.
7 See Kent Calder, “Securing security through prosperity: the San Francisco System in comparative
perspective”, The Pacific Review, Vo.l 17 No.1 March 2004: 135–157; James Baker, “America in Asia:
Emerging Architecture for a Pacific Community”, Foreign Affairs 70, no. 5 (Winter 1991/92), pp. 1–18.
8 Jeremy Friedman, “Soviet policy in the developing world and the Chinese challenge in the 1960s”, Cold
War History, Vol. 10, No. 2, May 2010, 247–272; speech by Chairman of the Delegation of the People’s
Republic of China, Deng Xiaoping, at the Special Session of the UN General Assembly, 10 April 1974.
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much of the 1970s and 1980s saw the steady improvement of the security environment
in the region from the American perspective, with China opening up its economy to
the Western world and supporting American efforts to fight against the Soviet
ambition of global domination. At a meeting with Deng Xiaoping in the mid-1970s,
Dr Henry Kissinger articulated their common concern: ‘We believe Soviet purposes are
still essentially hegemonial’. 9 Despite their differences over Taiwan, the US and China
established formal diplomatic relations during the Carter administration. China’s
economic reform and opening up in the 1980s under Deng’s leadership further
reinforced China’s position as a useful strategic partner for the West during the Cold
War. Senior American defence officials maintained direct contacts with Chinese
counterparts throughout the 1980s. Following Defense Secretary Caper Weinberger’s
Beijing visit in 1983 the US government agreed to establish military technological
cooperation with China.10
US-China relations took a dive when the Chinese leadership used force to suppress
the Tiananmen student protests for democracy in 1989 as the ColdWar approached its
end. Military-to-military contacts between the two countries were suspended. China’s
image as a reformed socialist country, embracing market principles in its economic
policies, ready for integration with the global economy and seeking to be part of the
prevailing Western-dominated world order, was shattered overnight.
Paradoxically the Cold War had allowed China to secure a stable security
environment for almost two decades when Beijing collaborated with the West and
focused on domestic economic reforms. While China’s strategic choice to form a
common front against the Soviet Union tilted the security balance in the Asia-Pacific
in favour of the US from the 1970s, the regional security order in East Asia was still
largely shaped by great power rivalry of the 1950s.
Post-Cold War Security Order in East Asia: The ASEAN Way
Central and Eastern Europe went through tumultuous transformations during the
early post-Cold War years, but East Asia remained relatively peaceful and stable. While
the implicit US-China alliance came to an abrupt end with the collapse of the Soviet
Union and in the aftermath of Tiananmen, Beijing pursued a non-confrontational
strategy that attempted to avoid conflicts with the US. Deng Xiaoping carefully steered
China along the path of further economic reform, adopting the foreign policy of
taoguang yanghui – maintaining a low profile and non-confrontational international
position. Deng and his successors Jiang Jemin and Hu Jintao managed to maintain
9Memorandum of Conversation on the meeting between Henry Kissinger and other American officials
with Deng Xiaoping and Chinese officials on 26 November 1974 submitted to President Ford, p.2 in
“National Security Adviser Kissinger Reports on USSR, China and Middle East Discussions, 1974–76”,
collection at the Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library and Museum. Available online at http://www.
fordlibrarymuseum.gov/library/document/0331/1553934.pdf
10 Shirley A. Kan, US-China Military Contacts: Issues for Congress, Congressional Research Report, 20
November 2013, p.1.
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China’s GDP growth at an average rate of around 10 per cent and kept the country on
track for prosperity and stability throughout the 1990s and 2000s.
During the early post-Cold War years and in the aftermath of the Tiananmen
Incident, the Chinese leadership pushed for ‘strategic partnerships’ with other major
powers in the form of great power diplomacy (daiguo waijiao) and good neighbour
diplomacy (zhoubian waijiao) in order to establish an international environment
in China’s neighbourhood that is conducive to modernization efforts so that the
country could focus on economic development. In attempting to allay international
concerns about the consequences of China’s growing importance as a global player
as the result of its economic success, Chinese leaders first promoted the idea of
‘the peaceful rise’ of China (heping jueqi) and then quickly changed it to ‘peace and
development’ (heping yu fazhan). Hu Jintao also presented the notion of a
‘harmonious world’ (hexie shijie). China’s strategy to manage the transition from the
Cold War to the end of a US-dominated unipolar word, as Avery Goldstein argued,
was the creation an international situation in which it would be an indispensable or
very attractive actor whose interests the other major powers would not want to
trample. 11 During this period, US-China trade expanded significantly.12
The end of the Cold War also gave rise to new regional security dynamics in East
Asia, linking Northeast and Southeast Asia. The US alliance structure remained in
place, but the end of Soviet influence and Washington’s preoccupation in Iraq and
Afghanistan following the September 11 2001 terrorist attacks, diverted US attention
from East Asia. China gained greater freedom in establishing its economic and
political influences at a time when regional economic links became more established.
The situation was further shaped by the decline of Japan as the leading regional power,
reviving the strategic competition of the two most important East Asian powers with a
complicated past historical rivalry, tainted by Chinese memory of Japanese atrocities
during the Second World War. This broader East Asian security complex that emerged
during the early post-Cold War years was in part driven by a common concern of
China’s growing influence, in part by the development of a more integrated regional
economy, and in part by the creation of regional institutional arrangements spear-
headed by the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). 13
Throughout the mid-1990s and the 2000s Beijing pursued a policy of reassurance
while focusing on building up the Chinese economy. The Chinese leadership gradually
accepted engagement with multilateral regional institutions. From the mid-1990s
onward Southeast Asian states were able to drive the development of a set of regional
security institutions. ASEAN managed to establish institutions and processes such as
11 Avery Goldstein, Rising to the Challenge: China’s Grand Strategy and International Security (Stanford,
CA: Stanford University Press, 2005), p.17.
12 US International Trade Commission data, quoted in Wayne M. Morrison, China-US Trade Issues,
Congressional Research Service Report, 10 February 2014, p. 3.
13 Barry Buzan in “Security architecture in Asia: the interplay of regional and global levels”, The Pacific
Review Vol 16, Issue 2, 2003.
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the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) with 17 dialogue partners in 1994, the ASEAN Plus
Three (APT) in 1997 to conduct meetings separately with China, Japan and South
Korea and later the East Asia Summit (EAS) in 2005 which comprised the three APT
members as well as India, Australia, and New Zealand and later the US and Russia
in 2011.
The establishment of regional security institutions and processes laid the
foundation for the expansion of an ASEAN-led multilateral regional security
framework involving all the major powers including not only China and the US, but
also Japan and Russia. Southeast Asian countries stepped up their efforts in managing
regional security challenges. The ASEAN-centred approach to regional security
mechanisms, characterised by non-intervention, consensus and informality, has been
regarded as ‘comfortable regionalism’. As Evelyn Goh argued, the ASEAN way brought
the great powers together in the immediate post-Cold War period by helping to
broaden great power representation in regional security, hence legitimising their roles.
ASEAN was able to ‘lock in US security commitment’, socialise China into ‘adopting
some self-restraining norms’, and renormalise Japan’s security role. Regional security
institutions promoted by ASEAN gained prominence in the regional security
landscape during the first two decades of the post-Cold-War era. But Goh rightly
noted the limitation of ASEAN which had not been able to introduce a regional
security order for long term stability in the Asia-Pacific. 14
East Asian Security in the ‘Post-America World’
East Asia arguably entered a new phase as the first decade of the 21st Century came to
an end when US dominance in the region began to be challenged by a rising China.
Through a cooperative approach and the expansion of economic ties, China
successfully transformed its relationship with its Southern neighbours who had been
shaped by several decades of fear and suspicion created by ideological differences and
strategic divisions during the Cold War era. With its growing economic power and
global presence, being the largest manufacturer, merchandise exporter and holder of
foreign exchange reserves in the world, Chinese influence also grew in Southeast Asia.
Arguing that America is now in decline, Fareed Zakaria suggested in his Post-American
World and the Rise of the Rest that other powers such as China and India have become
important global players challenging US global dominance. 15
The turning point was the financial crisis of 2008–2009. Whether or not the US has
been truly in decline is clearly still a topic of much debated.16 There is, however, little
doubt that perceptions of America in decline, both in the US and internationally,
14 Evelyn Goh, “Institutions and the great power bargain in East Asia: ASEAN’s limited ‘brokerage’ role”,
International Relations of the Asia-Pacific Vol. 11 (2011) pp.373–401.
15 Fareed Zakaria, Post-American World and the Rise of the Rest (London: Penguin Books, 2009).
16 See for example, Joseph S. Nye Jr., “The Future of American Power: Dominance and Decline in
Perspective”, Foreign Affairs, November/December 2010.
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became widespread after the global financial crisis. According to surveys by Pew
Research on 18 countries in both 2009 and 2011, the median percentage saying China
will replace or already has replaced the US as the world’s leading superpower increased
from 40% in 2009 to 47% in 2011. Another Pew report in 2013 also suggested that for
the first time in surveys dating back nearly 40 years, a majority of those polled, said that
the role of the United States as a world leader was less important compared to a decade
ago.17
The US and China did make efforts to promote greater cooperation through
establishing formal channels and regular meetings in the form of high bilateral
economic and strategic dialogues on an annual basis in addition to numerous official
interactions and even military-to-military meetings. The economist Fred Bergsten and
former National Security Adviser Zbigniew Brzezinski put forward the idea a G2 –
that being the largest economies and trading nations as well as polluters, the US and
China should work together to address international economic issues and other global
problems.18 But American efforts during the first two years of the Obama
administration to engage China as a global partner in addressing global concerns such
as climate change ended in failure.19
By 2011, when China overtook Japan to become the world’s second largest economy,
Beijing seemed to have abandoned its low profile and cautious approach to foreign
policy. Examples of China’s assertiveness or ‘abrasive diplomacy’ included: Chinese
harassment ofUSNavy ship IMPECCABLE on surveillance duty in internationalwaters off
the coast of South China in 2009; Chinese Foreign Minister Yang Jiechi’s warning to
Southeast Asian states against coordinating with outside power in their maritime
territorial disputes with China at the ASEAN Regional Forum; the Chinese demand for
apology and compensation from the Japanese government for arresting and detaining
the captain of aChinese fishing boat that collidedwith a Japanese coast guard vessel even
after hewas released; andChinese warnings to theUS andKorea against their joint naval
exercises in international waters in the Yellow Sea after the sinking of the South Korean
Navy ship CHEONAN and the shelling of Yeonpyeong by North Korea.20
The stage seemed set for a Sino-US confrontation when Hilary Clinton put forward
the Obama’s administration’s ‘Pivot to Asia’ concept in November 2011. The
American Secretary of State wrote: ‘The future of politics will be decided in Asia, not
Afghanistan or Iraq, and the United States will be right at the center of the action’. 21
17 Richard Wike, Changing Global Perceptions of the U.S. in the Post-Sept. 11 Era: From Hyperpower to
Declining Power Pew Global Attitudes Project, 7 September 2011; America’s Place in the World, 2013, Pew
Research Center, 2013.
18 C. Fred Bergsten, “Tow’s Company” Letter to the Editor, Foreign Affairs, September/October 2009,
Zbigniew Brzezinski, “The Group of Two that could change the World”, Financial Times, 13 January 2009.
19 Jeffrey Bader, Obama and China’s Rise: An Insider’s Account of America’s Asia Strategy, (Washington
DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2012).
20 Thomas J. Christensen, “The Advantages of an Assertive China: Responding to Beijing’s Abrasive
Diplomacy”, Foreign Affairs, March/April Vol. 90 No. 2, 2011.
21 Hilary Clinton, “America’s Pacific Century”, Foreign Policy, November 2011.
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For some observers the centrepiece of America’s ‘Pivot’ policy, subsequently termed
‘rebalancing’, is the containment of China, signifying the return of George Kennan’s
doctrine to American foreign policy with a new enemy and in a different part of the
world. Writing for the Asia Times, Ninan Koshy concluded that, ‘The pivot strategy
announces the beginning of a new cold war’. He suggested that the Asia-Pacific has
replaced Europe as the theatre of the ColdWar and China has become the enemy of the
US in the Asia-Pacific.22
The claim that the Asia ‘pivot’ is containment in disguise is problematic, even
though some observers in both China and the US have come to that conclusion. In fact
Obama’s re-balancing does not represent a complete transformation of US
engagement in East Asia. As a 2012 Congressional Research Service report made
clear, the ‘pivot’ represented a change of means rather than a change of goals. Although
Obama’s initiatives such as military deployment in Australia and Southeast Asia, its
more integrated approach to the Asia-Pacific region, and its broader vision of the
region to include the coastal areas of South Asia are new features in US policy towards
East Asia, in the military sphere Obama simply accelerated and expanded policies
undertaken by the George W. Bush Administration. Obama’s policy of intensifying the
US focus on the southern and western parts of the region through rotational
deployment rather than deployments of permanent bases; strengthening relations with
existing Asian allies; negotiating the Trans-Pacific Partnership; and forging new
partnerships with India, Indonesia and Vietnam were a continuation of policies set in
place by Bush. Overall, Obama stepped up efforts to strengthen US diplomatic
presence and visibility in the region and worked more closely with multilateral
regional institutions in Southeast Asia.23
ASEAN’s capacity in managing the security challenges, however, has been
questioned as East Asia becomes more turbulent with rising tensions over territorial
disputes between China and Japan as well as in the South China Sea. The unity of
ASEAN, for example, was tested in July 2012 at a foreign ministers’ meeting in
Cambodia when for the first time ASEAN members failed to issue a joint statement
because of their differences over the South China Sea disputes.24 Southeast Asian
countries would not want to see the region to be completely dominated by either
power, but a war between the two powers would also lead to devastating consequences
for the region.
Given Beijing’s growing assertiveness and Washington’s rebalancing, the security
environment from 2011 onward clearly saw the rivalry between two global powers
becoming more intense. But the relationship between the two is defined not simply in
strategic terms. Unlike the Cold War rivalry between the US and the Soviet Union, the
deepening of economic interdependence between the two major powers and
22 “US pivot risks Asia-Pacific cold war”, Asia Times June 13, 2013.
23Mark E. Manyin et al., “Pivot to the Pacific? The Obama Administration’s ‘Rebalancing’ Toward Asia”,
Congressional Research Service, 28 March 2012.
24 Ernest Z. Bower, “China reveals its hand on ASEAN in Phnom Penh”, East Asian Forum, 28 July 2012.
654 J.T.H. Tang
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
by
 [S
ing
ap
or
e M
an
ag
em
en
t U
niv
ers
ity
] a
t 2
2:4
8 0
3 D
ec
em
be
r 2
01
7 
throughout the region is another key feature of East Asia international relations.
In 2013 the US remained China’s second largest trade partner, after the EU, followed
by ASEAN. The US is also a leading source of Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) to
China.25 From 2008 Chinese corporations have also begun investing heavily in the US.
By 2011 FDI flows from China into the US exceeded FDI flow in the opposite
direction.26 While closer economic ties can sometimes be a source of friction between
the two countries, their strong economic relationship has generated a set of common
interests.
By proposing a ‘new model of major power relations’ (xinxing daguo guanxi) in
managing US-China relations, Xi Jinping clearly attempted to address the security
dilemma that is commonly associated from the rise of a new major power in the
international system. The key features of such a relationship, as put forward by Xi in
the first summit meeting with Obama include ‘mutual understanding and strategic
trust’, ‘respecting each other’s “core interests”’, ‘mutually beneficial cooperation’, and
‘enhancing cooperation and coordination in international affairs and on global issues’.
This ‘new model’ may not be the answer to resolve the differences between the two
powers, but leaders of the two countries are clearly aware of the danger of a US-China
confrontation. 27
East Asian International relations have entered yet another phase in the second
decade of the 21st Century. The security order that is emerging in the region is the
outcome of a complex process of power transition which is going to be protracted,
marked by both intense competition, and sometimes even confrontations, but also
cooperation.
Conclusions
Perhaps a better question is whether or not the Cold War ever ended in East Asia. The
legacy of the Cold War is still very much part of the regional security dynamics in the
21st Century. The geopolitical divide in the region and the security alliance system are
products of the Cold war era. The East Asia ‘theatre’ of the Cold War, was also made
more complex by China’s efforts in linking de-colonisation with the communist ‘world
revolution’ and later making national security a central concern in managing its
relationship between the US and the USSR.
The US-China rivalry in this current period, however, is clearly far more
complicated than US-Soviet relationship during the Cold War. The US and the Soviet
25 The figures are from various Chinese government sources and international agencies compiled by
Wayne M. Morrison in China’s Economic Rise: History, Trends, Challenges, and Implications for the United
States, Congressional Research Service, 3 February 2014.
26 Daniel H. Rosen and Thio Hanemann, New Realities in the US-China Investment Relationship,
Rhodium Group report commissioned by the US Chamber of Commerce, April 2014.
27 The two met at Sunnylands, California in June, 2013. See China Daily, 14 June 2013; David
M. Lampton, “A New Type of Major-Power Relationship: Seeking a Durable Foundation for U.S.-China
Ties”, in Asia Policy 16 (July 2013).
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Union were adversaries with little interaction whereas interdependence, interaction,
and engagement are important features in US-China relations. The US and China,
despite their political differences and competition, are also engaging with each other at
multiple levels and are economically deeply interdependent. 28 In fact a number of
observations on other historical parallels between the current situation in East Asia
and earlier periods have been drawn. Graham Allison, for example, referred the
challenge of China’s rise to ‘the Thucydides trap’ - when the rise of Athens inspired fear
in Sparta and resulted in the Peloponnesian War of the fifth century BC. Meanwhile,
the Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe compared China in 2014 with Germany in
1914.29
By providing a brief review of the evolution of the East Asia security order since the
Cold War, this paper suggests that contemporary East Asian international relations are
far more complex than those of the bipolar Cold War era. Will China’s rise lead to war
according to the Mearsheimerean logic of the tragedy of great power politics? Can
China embrace the core features of the liberal international order and avoid following
the path of a world-wrenching power transition as suggested by John Ikenberry? Are
the interactions of confrontation and cooperation taking the form of a Cool War?30
These are important questions, but they are about power rivalry in general which
should not be confused with the contest between the US and the USSR from
1947–1991. It is clear that the global contest between two rival blocs with competing
ideologies and separate economic systems in two distinctive camps of the ColdWar era
is not returning to East Asia. The legacy of the Cold War, however, has continued to
shape the security landscape in the region while a new East Asian security order is in
the making.
28 Stephan Fru¨hling, “When a Cold War in East Asia is not a Cold War”, East Asia Forum, 2 March 2014;
Michishita Narushige and Peter van der Hoest “Another Cold War in Asia?”, ASAN Forum, 13 July 2013.
29 Graham Allison “Avoiding Thucydides’s Trap” Financial Times, August 22, 2012; Jane Perlezian,
“Japan’s Leader Compares Strain With China to Germany and Britain in 1914”, New York Times, 23 Jan
2014.
30 Noah Feldman, Cool War: The Future of Global Competition (New York: Random House, 2013).
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